In his previous post, Brian Weston described the RAAF’s transition from the Avon Sabre to the Mirage IIIO during the 1960s. The Mirage IIIO remained in operational RAAF service from 1965 to 1988. The transition from the second generation Mirage to the fourth generation Hornet began with the Government’s selection of the Hornet in October 1981. This post explores that transition. As Weston highlights, the Hornet transition involved more than simply flying a new jet, the organisational changes resulting from introduction into service of the new capability laid the foundation for the operational success of the RAAF’s air combat capability in 2003.
![A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornet taxies back into the main air operating base in the Middle East Region following a mission in support of Operation Okra. [Image Credit: Department of Defence]](http://centralblue.williamsfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/20170327raaf8540618_0018-1024x684.jpg)
A Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18A Hornet taxies back into the main air operating base in the Middle East Region following a mission in support of Operation Okra. [Image Credit: Department of Defence]
Much of the capability gain came not just from generational and technological developments, but from the size of the Hornet which conferred immediate improvements in payload and sensors, especially radar aperture and power.
The Hornet also improved on a major limitation of the Mirage, namely, its short range. Not that the Mirage was any worse than its 1950s peers; simply, the advance of time and technology gave the Hornet a 25 per cent increase.
More significantly the Hornet was capable of air-to-air refueling, thus setting right some earlier conceptual thinking, when the RAAF asked Dassault not to equip the Mirage IIIO with single-point pressure refueling, on the basis that pressure refueling facilities would not be available at forward operating airfields. This decision had long term consequences, because even if the RAAF had later sought to modify the Mirage for air-to-air refueling, it could not be done easily as there was no single-point pressure refueling manifold within the Mirage into which to tap an air-to-air refueling probe.
To these enhancements, brought about by greater size and an ability to refuel while in flight, can be added aerodynamic advances, digital technology generational advances, and the benefits flowing from the F/A-18A human/machine interface which set a new benchmark in fighter cockpit design.
The RAAF had done well, and its promotion into a bigger league of tactical fighters was starkly evident when the first two F/A-18B aircraft were ferried to Australia, non-stop, across the Pacific.
Given its 20 years of Mirage operational experience, the RAAF also had a solid foundation on which to introduce the new fighter. That expertise had been gained not only from the permanent deployment of Mirages to Malaysia, but also from an increasing participation in Australian and regional exercises, including deployments to the USAF Pacific Air Forces Exercise Cope Thunder, at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, commencing in 1981.
Like the preceding transition to the Mirage, that of the Hornet also needed to be accomplished without any loss of operational capability. So when No 3 Squadron returned from RAAF Base (now Royal Malaysian Air Force Base) Butterworth to convert to the Hornet, a new Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was formed at Butterworth to meet Australia’s Five Power Defence Agreement obligations.
During the Sabre to Mirage transition, No 2 (Fighter) Operational Conversion Unit was over-burdened, but this time it was tasked solely with Hornet training. And rather than establish another fighter training unit to assume responsibility for the ongoing Mirage conversion courses, as had been done for the Sabre to Mirage transition, the conduct of all Mirage operational conversions was transferred to No 77 Squadron–contravening the dictum that military training should always be carried out in training units, not operational units.
No 77 Squadron also assumed responsibility for the Macchi MB-326H lead-in fighter training and for the conduct of the last Mirage fighter combat instructor course. All this, while maintaining its status as an operational fighter squadron. This was not a smart decision, as was evident when the unit’s aircraft establishment and annual flying rate grew to more than 40 aircraft and 11,000 hours per year respectively.
After No 77 Squadron converted to the Hornet in 1987, No 75 Squadron followed. No 75 Squadron, which had been based in Darwin with its Mirages since 1983, then moved to the newly-constructed base at Tindal. The sole remaining Mirage unit, No 79 Squadron, was concurrently disbanded, thus ending two decades of Australian service by Dassault’s elegant fighter, and bringing an end to 32 years of a permanent RAAF fighter presence in Malaysia.
The transition from Mirage to Hornet was completed in May 1989, along with the most significant reorganisation of RAAF operational units since World War II. This change amalgamated all of the RAAF’s tactical fighter units and air defence radars, irrespective of where they were located, into one operational group, the Tactical Fighter Group.
The RAAF had successfully brought into service not only an outstanding tactical fighter but also a new system of functional command, changes that without doubt, contributed to the exemplary performance of No 75 Squadron in the Iraq War of 2003, where the unit successfully conducted air superiority, close air support and air interdiction operations.
This piece was initially published in the April 2017 issue of Australian Aviation.
Air Vice-Marshal Brian Weston (Ret’d) was Commander of the Tactical Fighter Group from July 1909 to July 1993. He is currently a board member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation.
Loved this article, the Canberra/F-4E/F111 transition would be a fascinating case study as well. As a layman it seems that the F-4E was a superior to the MirageIII, particularly as BVR fighter, was there any thought given to retaining them?
Response from Brian Weston:
There is no doubt the McDonnell (from 1967, McDonnell Douglas) F-4E Phantom II deserves its place in the Fighter Hall of Fame of the Twentieth Century. But certainly that would not have been obvious in December 1958, when the USN declared the large, two-seat, ‘gunless’ Phantom II, with a heritage stemming from the undistinguished McDonnell Demon and Voodoo, as superior to the Chance Vought Crusader III in satisfying a USN requirement for a long-range interceptor and attack fighter.
After that decision, and for the next few years, the Phantom II continued to evolve slowly ‘under the radar’ as a dedicated naval fighter.
But that changed in 1963 when US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, declared, notwithstanding the USAF having no interest in the Phantom II, that the next USAF fighter would need to be common to the USN, USMC and USAF. Soon after, the re-designated F-110 Phantom II (a very short-lived designation) won a fly-off against the Convair F-106 Delta Dart. The USAF now had a new fighter, which it evolved into the F-4C Phantom II. The rest is history, as with the USAF now committed to the fighter, the Phantom II continued to evolve with the ‘slatted wing’ F-4E generally representing its full maturity.
So why in 1973 did the RAAF hand back its 24 leased F-4E aircraft to the USAF when it seemed obvious the RAAF would be better off by converting one of its three fighter squadrons from Mirage IIIO to F-4E, and storing 24 of its oldest Mirage IIIO aircraft?
In a nutshell: lack of funds; lack of personnel; and the costs associated with establishing and sustaining a third logistic/support/training infrastructure for a third fleet of RAAF fast jets – F-111C, F-4E and Mirage IIIO.
Fast jet fleets come with huge upfront and sustainment costs. In 1973 the RAAF was taking on the enormous burden of supporting the sophisticated F-111C, a cost it had under-estimated. To attempt to sustain the operation of 24 RAAF F-4E aircraft while simultaneously operating 24 F-111C and a reduced fleet of around 70 Mirages was unviable, especially given the Australian government, in the post-Vietnam War period, was stripping Defence of much of its funding.