In the right circumstances Ground-Based Air Defence can be a game-changer. Given that the Australian Defence Force invariably deploys when it fights, it is a capability our defence planners need to take more seriously.
The popular image of the fight to win control of the air is one of scores of fighters locked in swirling dogfights, epitomised by the Battle of Britain in World War II and MiG Alley in Korea. A less well-known method of asserting air control is Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD), which in certain circumstances has been very successful.
GBAD incorporates all or some of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, early-warning systems, and command and control centres, almost invariably in fixed locations. It has often been the choice of technologically modest and under-resourced forces opposed to superior opponents.
The battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was a prime example. Despite not even having an air force, the Viet Minh (North Vietnam) were able to assert control of the air over their technologically-advanced French enemies using an ad hoc GBAD system.
Dien Bien Phu was one of a number of remote fortified camps the French established hoping to draw their elusive enemy into “meat-grinder” set-piece battles. Because of the camps’ isolation, their airstrips were vital for resupply, reinforcement, and launching close air attack missions, which in turn made local control of the air essential. The French believed their airstrip at Dien Bien Phu could not be threatened.
But the Viet Minh confounded French expectations by using 30,000 peasant labourers to man-handle two regiments of artillery and heavy mortars though the jungle onto the hilltops overlooking Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Minh now dominated the airstrip, which they made almost unusable. With their lifeline cut, the French were eventually over-run.
Egypt similarly employed GBAD to negate Israel’s overwhelmingly superior air force during the first week of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In the June 1967 Six-Day War, the Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed on the ground by the Israeli Air Force in a matter of hours. Learning from that experience, in 1973 Egypt’s leaders essentially kept their air force out of harm’s way and relied instead on an intensive GBAD system of missiles and AAA, especially along the Suez Canal.
Complacent after its 1967 victory, the IAF was caught unprepared for this different threat and in the first few days lost about 15 percent of its strike/fighters. The loss rate was unsustainable. It was only after Israeli tanks and paratroopers had smashed a gap in the Egyptians’ GBAD barrier through which Israel’s jets could safely fly that the IAF was able to assert its usual dominance over the battlefield. Egypt’s use of GBAD was a clever tactic which succeeded for a week against a technologically and operationally vastly superior force.
An even more striking result was achieved by mujahideen guerillas fighting against Soviet invaders in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.
Initially the Soviets enjoyed uncontested air supremacy, which enabled their Mi-8 and Mi-25 heavy-lift and attack helicopters to play an apparently war-winning role, with the guerillas being unable to cope with the manoeuvre and firepower the helicopters provided. However, the situation changed dramatically in 1986 when the US supplied the mujahideen with Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. In the next three years the guerillas shot-down some 270 Soviet helicopters, creating a decisive shift of momentum in the war.
Australia’s post-World War II experience with GBAD has been slight.
The Army has operated small numbers of short-range, point-defence-only weapons which could scarcely be described as a system. The RAAF went much further in 1961 when it established No. 30 Squadron at Williamtown, equipped with Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles and early-warning radars. With an intercept envelope of 45 kilometres range and 9000 to 50,000 feet altitude, the Bloodhound was typical of its generation. It was also typically inflexible. Even with a (dubious) claimed kill-probability of 90 percent for each salvo of four missiles fired, scores of batteries would have been required to defend Australia’s many high-value targets.
Following No. 30 Squadron’s disbandment in 1968, the RAAF has shown little interest in GBAD systems. Indeed, applying the maxim that attack is the best form of defence, the RAAF’s approach to the broader issue of control of the air has been active rather than passive. Of note here is the recent acquisition of twelve EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, which can detect and jam most – some commentators say all – known forms of surface-to-air threats.
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper flagged an intention to acquire a new short-range GBAD system for the Army “by the early 2020s” and a medium-range system by the “mid-to-late 2020s”. These are good intentions but, to state the obvious, the time-frame is relaxed.
As the experiences outlined in this article illustrate (and there are more), in the right circumstances GBAD can be a game-changer. Given that the Australian Defence Force invariably deploys when it fights, it is a capability our defence planners need to take more seriously.
Cody Stephens is a law graduate who works in technology and innovation research
Hi Cody, interesting article but I wonder about the applicability of the example scenarios that you’ve selected. The Afghan mujahideen were using a similar type of short-range point-defence AA weapons that the Australian Army has now, and were able to achieve operational outcomes with them. The Egyptian experience was predicated on a narrow frontage which had been static for many years, allowing sufficient time for them to thicken their AA defences, and also coincided with the recent introduction of the SA-6 SAM system against 2nd and 3rd generation Israeli jets. Viet Minh domination of the airstrip at Dien Bien Phu was achieved by a combination of artillery and anti-air assets significantly less capable than what the ADF has today.
The point should also be raised that, in two out of the three examples cited, those actors did not possess air forces of their own at that time, and the superiority of the Israeli air force was one of the reasons why the Egyptians opted to focus its efforts at control of the air using non-aerial assets. The ADF has not deployed into a non-permissible air environment in the past sixty years, and our air and naval assets provide anti- and counter-air capability in a maritime and expeditionary environment. Does the ADF therefore need to try and fill a niche that seems to be filled already, in order to address historical scenarios which may not be applicable to our current force structure and strategic environment?
I think a stronger argument for the serious consideration of the ADF’s GBAD capability would be argue a) that we may not always be deploying into a permissible air environment, and that modern air-to-surface weapons dictate that our land forces should have an embedded ability to defend themselves against hostile aircraft; b) that the inherent characteristics of air power (fragility and impermanence) mean that we may not always be able to rely solely on the RAAF to deliver persistent counter-air capability; and c) that an enhanced Australian GBAD capability can, with a greater institutional appreciation of the capabilities of GBAD, improve our own air operations in the face of potentially adversarial GBAD systems.
Thanks Oliver, I enjoyed your comments.
I accept that GBAD’s effectiveness can be situation-specific, that is, it’s not as flexible as a system based on fighter aircraft. Still, fighters are usually dependent on geographically-fixed information systems such as early-warning radars and command and control centres, so that model isn’t necessarily as flexible as we might think.
It was also the case that in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Egyptian GBAD wasn’t simply anchored to the Suez Canal. On the contrary, under the skilful guidance of their Soviet advisors, the Egyptians routinely moved some of their mobile SA-6 and ZSU-2-34 batteries around the combat zone to adjust to the changing tactical situation. It’s worth remembering that the Egyptian GBAD caused the Israeli Air Force serious problems along the Canal, to the extent that the IAF lost control of the air. It was only when Israeli Army general Ariel Sharon’s armour and infantry smashed a gap in the Egyptian GBAD that the IAF was able to assert itself. In effect, land forces won control of the air.
The Egyptians and the Syrians both established independent Air Defence Commands after their air forces were humiliated by the IAF in the 1967 Six-Day War. Essentially, the ADCs did GBAD and the air forces did aeroplanes. I’m not sure how much credit can be given to that organisational change for the Arabs’ improved performance in 1973, but it is a fact that for the first week along the Suez and over the Golan Heights, the IAF’s loss rate was unsustainable.
Is it fair to evoke a comparison between the development by Western air forces of GBAD and of UAVs? Specifically, are organisations run by pilots likely to whole-heartedly support capabilities that will do them out of a job?
Hi Cody,
Continuing on with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, I note that the Egyptian GBAD system caused the Israeli Air Force to lose control of the air…above the west bank of the Suez Canal only. It did not translate into the Egyptian Air Force being able to penetrate Israeli airspace or to extend their control of the air beyond the missile envelope of their GBAD. Indeed, the Egyptian Army was reluctant to advance beyond their bridgeheads for fear of leaving the GBAD envelope and exposing themselves to the Israeli Air Force, as evidenced by the lacklustre Egyptian preparation and subesequent poor performance during the Battle of the Sinai when they did eventually push forward. I also point to Operation Tagar on the second day of the war, in which the Israeli Air Force managed to penetrate Egyptian airspace and damage seven airbases, for the loss of only two planes, as being evidence that the Egyptian GBAD did not effectively assert air control, whereas the Israeli Air Force was able to engage in a range of operations stretching from the Golan Heights, across Israel, and into Egypt.
Once again, I dispute the assertion that control of the air can be won from the ground alone. It certainly can contribute, as Israeli air defences did during the 1973 war, but on its own all that GBAD can do is contest the air. Whether or not the Egyptian military could have attained control of the air was up to the Egyptian Air Force, and its failure in that regard meant that the sucess of Egyptian GBAD, no matter how pronounced, was always going to be limited.
In the ADF at least, GBAD is solely the domain of the Army, and so within an Australian context I think the RAAF’s lack of serious consideration of GBAD during the past fifty years is not the best comparison with UAS. At a doctrinal level, GBAD is not seen as an Air Force capability, whereas UAS is very much one avenue for Air Force’s future development. The senior leadership of the RAAF may be overwhelming pilots, but they still rely on SMEs to advise them. ADGs, for example, remain a RAAF capability despite the Army arguably being able to perform the same function. Surely if the pilot’s perspective was the sole priority then we wouldn’t have ADGs anymore either!
Overall, however, I still agree with your contention that there’s a case to be made for greater development of the ADF’s GBAD capability. But I question the applicability of historical precedence in making that case – after all, the next war is likely to be very different to the previous one. A further question would be: what kind of GBAD should we be looking to acquire? If the future of air combat is cheap, disposable, mass-produced UAS, then should we be looking at returning to anti-aircraft artillery guns instead of surface-to-air missiles to supplement our aircraft?
Hi Cody, nice piece. I’m not sure whether the IAF in ’73 took so many early losses primarily because of the Arab GBAD – which was a factor – or because the situation meant the IAF had to throw assets into CAS without sufficient control of the air.
I think that draws out the fundamental limitation of GBAD: it can deny the air to others but denying others does not necessarily grant access. Aircraft are expensive, but so are sophisticated GBAD systems – which do you think is more cost effective?
Thanks for the post!
Good food for thought Cody,
With airpower relying on fixed installations a counter-PGM GBAD capability is an absolute baseline requirement to preserve our ability to operate in any contested environment. PGMs, both air to ground and SFC-SFC are increasingly a factor. This requirement also extends to a cheap and flexible method of countering tactical UAS that are being employed to great effect by state and non-state actors.
GBAD cost the Israelis local air superiority and prevented the IAF from providing CAS to the army at an acceptable cost, if the umbrella had been able to keep pace with the armour we may have seen a markedly different result. Modern threat systems are far more capable and our relative ability to counter them is probably worse than 1973. Unless we invest in a robust, full spectrum GBAD capability the ADF may experience aerial bombardment for the first time since Korea