‘Flexibility is the key to air power’ is one of the favourite clichés of the professional airman. In this post, Flight Lieutenant Jenna Higgins asks if, in light of the USMC’s recent successful proof of concept demonstration of the F-35B VSTOL, the ADF should demonstrate flexibility in reviewing the decision of whether to acquire the F-35B to operate off its newly commissioned Canberra Class LHDs.
![Australias first Lockheed Martin, F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter on its inaugural flight on 29 September 2014. [Image Credit: Lockheed Martin]](http://centralblue.williamsfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/20141001DMO0000_0003-300x200.jpg)
Australias first Lockheed Martin, F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter on its inaugural flight, 29 September 2014. [Image Credit: Lockheed Martin]
Fortunately, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has embarked on a journey to introduce an amphibious warfare capability as part of the ADF repertoire, which may enable the ADF to extend the reach of its soon to be acquired air combat capabilities. The two Canberra Class LHD vessels, both now commissioned, are based on Spain’s Juan Carlos I, which was designed with the AV-8B Harrier STOVL (Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing) ‘jump jets’ in mind. The Canberra Class LHDs enable the ADF to, amongst other things, more readily address emergent threats in the broader Indo-Pacific region. With that said, it is well understood amongst the Defence community that the induction of these platforms is just beginning of the quest for an amphibious warfare capability.
![This Canberra Class LHD HMAS Adelaide departing Sydney Harbour in early November 2016 to take part in Exercise OCEAN RAIDER. [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia]](http://centralblue.williamsfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/20161128ran8095633_083-1024x613.jpg)
HMAS Adelaide, the Royal Australian Navy’s second Canberra Class LHD, departs Sydney Harbour in early November 2016 to take part in Exercise OCEAN RAIDER. [Image Credit: Commonwealth of Australia]
The USMC are currently preparing for its first overseas operational deployment of the F-35 in January 2017. Given that they will be operating in our area of strategic interest, they are perhaps the best example for Australia to model an amphibious concept of operations (CONOP). But up to this point, the manner in which the USMC would operate with their new platforms in the region has been largely theoretical. However, over the period 18-20 November the USMC successfully conducted a ‘Lightning Carrier Proof of Concept Demo’.
This exercise demonstrated the beginnings of an efficacious shift in CONOP which recognises the potential of enhanced connectivity and a more robust fixed-wing capability. While the USMC uses different platforms, with a combination of the F-35B and MV-22 Osprey, it is the F-35B and Carrier CONOP that holds the most telling lessons for Australia. Using this new CONOP, the USMC are able to penetrate enemy defences, deliver a force to an undefended area, and attack outwards as opposed to ‘attacking the enemy at its teeth’. Precisely what the 2016 Defence White Paper outlines as Australia’s defence strategy – protecting our shores while taking the defence away from our borders. Using the advanced connectivity of the F-35, the Carrier is no longer removed from the mission whilst the aircraft are on task. In the final phase of the exercise, the USMC demonstrated the ability for the F-35 to integrate with the Aegis combat system aboard a US Navy Cruiser in order to provide targeting data to an anti-air ballistic missile-defence weapon system on board the ship.
So what does this mean for Australia? While the purchase of the F-35B variant has previously been discussed and subsequently dismissed on the grounds of cost and complexity, it is a discussion that should not be shelved completely. Yes, expense needs to be considered; however, the concept is not a flawed one. Capability costs money. And when the money is being directed towards an unknown entity or a theoretical concept it can be a tough ask. But we now have a clear intent for amphibious operations, a clear intent for the Indo-Pacific region, and a real-time framework (based in our operating area) provided by the USMC to track. Yes, modifications for the LHD would be required, and re-think of how we conduct amphibious, but perhaps the future purchase of the F-35B wouldn’t be so silly?
Flight Lieutenant Jenna Higgins is a currently serving Royal Australian Air Force Air Combat Officer. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.
The RAAF hierarchy will have many reasons for rejecting this notion, most of them ostensibly reasonable. But at a time of extreme strategic uncertainty – think Chinese and Russian adventurism, Islamic fundamentalism, right-wing resurgence, rapidly growing global inequality, uncertainty over US leadership under Trump – it will be even more important than usual to keep our military options open. So, this is a debate worth “reigniting”.
Hi Jenna, thanks for the thought provoking article. I’m interested in your thoughts on how the USMC’s specific role within the broader US military influences your argument. I think it’s important because the CONOP the USMC demonstrated sits within the broader security envelope – and firepower – provided by USN and USAF assets. The ADF is small but, as you point out, it has theatre-wide responsibilities so RAAF F-35s have to do the jobs of the USAF, USN, and USMC F-35s. The F-35B trades capability for VSTOL and part of the reason those trades are acceptable to the USMC is because of the presence of USAF and USN assets – can the RAAF accept those same trades?
I guess like always, the devil is in the detail. How significant would the modifications to the LHDs be? Would they still be able to fulfill their originally intended task? Another issue that jumps out is the size of our Navy. It would require almost the entire remaining RAN to provide the frigates, destroyers and SSKs required to protect a CV. An F-35B may be low observable and able to penetrate A2AD environments but it has very short legs and operates from highly detectable assault ships within range of a lot of seriously capable SFC-SFC missiles. AAR from a supporting P-8 or embarked MV-22 would be a game changer
Though in theory the revival of an Australian aircraft carrier capability may sound like a good idea, I believe that the increase in ‘on paper’ capability it would bring would be to the detriment of actual capability across the force. This is due to the impact of the additional capability on the RAAF’s ability to train and develop a proficient fast jet pilot workforce.
Ensuring an adequate flow of proficient fast jet aircrew is a challenge for the RAAF now, let alone with the addition of a capability that requires the development of the specific non-combat skills associated with operating jets off a carrier. Carrier aviation requires skills that cannot be skimped upon; the recent loss of two Russian jets of the Kuznetsov in the Meditteranean highlight the dangers inherent with carrier ops. If we were to pursue the F-35B to operate from the Canberra-Class LHD, then we should expect to spend a significant proportion of the available training budget (both for the F-35Bs and the LHDs) to ensure proficiency in carrier operations. To do otherwise would be to invite an unacceptable increase in peacetime attrition of assets and crews. Taking the argument further, and acknowledging the reality of budget constraints, we would have to accept a loss in combat-related training across the RAAF’s air combat capability to ensure non-combat related proficiency. Is this something that the ADF can afford to accept?
This all comes down to a question of resources and the fact that although something is achievable it may not be advisable.
Gadfly: I don’t think the ADF’s force posture – and, therefore, its ability to prosecute various kinds of military actions – should be determined by the RAAF’s training system. If government and defence leaders were to decide that we should have a seaborne air strike and air defence capability, then the RAAF should adjust its training priorities accordingly. To pickup on the title of one of the preceding blogs, there’s no chicken-and-egg conundrum here: strategic needs should drive force structuring.
CBG: I accept your point, Force Structure should be guided by assessed strategic requirements. But I counter that strategic requirements must be informed by an understanding of the reality of resource constraints.
This may sound like I recommend putting the cart before the horse, but the truth of the matter is that the strategy that you pursue must account for the resources you have to pursue it. By strategy here I do not mean the end-state that Australia desires, but a more nuanced (and useful) appreciation of the concept: a plan for creating a preferred future. Knowing where you want to go is important, but tempering that with an appreciation of what you have to get you there is as important.
My point above was that there is an opportunity cost associated with the development of a ‘carrier capability’ with the F-35B and Canberra Class. That cost is a decrease in the overall proficiency in our air combat capability due to the requirement to ensure the proficiency of the airmen and sailors in the unique and challenging requirements of carrier operations. There will be a decrease in proficiency because training that would otherwise be directed towards improving proficiency in air combat roles would now be redirected to non-combat related training. The only way to address this would be through an increase in available resources: flying and sailing hours, as well as pilot numbers. These costs would be in addition to the expenses associated with operating different variants of the F-35 and in making the LHD suitable to accommodate the F-35.
This is achievable and through this additional investment the ADF would gain the ability to project more force using the LHD, but the question that must be asked is: ‘What are we going to give up, either within the Defence vote or in other areas of Government spending, to pay for this?’
In sum: Strategy must drive force structure, but resource constraints must inform strategy. This is not a chicken and egg scenario, it is a virtuous circle of strategic reality.
Gadfly: I appreciate that we can only have the force structure – and therefore the essential means for prosecuting a/some specific strategy/ies – we can afford. But I also appreciate that the ADF’s ownership of some elements of its force structure might owe as much to political opportunism (some might say this about 12 submarines) or single-service culture (delete “submarines”, insert “75 F-35As”).
The Australian defence budget is $32 billion, a sum greater than the GDP of 88 of the world’s nations according to World Bank data. I find it hard to believe there isn’t room for manoeuvre within that vast amount.
There’s nothing virtuous about putting the cart before the horse, which is what’s likely to happen when “Platformitis” precedes strategy.
CBG: I will not challenge you on the political aspects of capability development; military capability development and management is as much an extension of policy as the application of the same capability is in war. I also fully support you on the statement that we need to move away from the focus on platforms.
I believe that the Australian government should not pursue the F-35B/LHD combo capability not because I don’t think it would be a useful capability to have, but because I believe the effects desired can be achieved in other, more effective ways.
To illustrate my point, I will challenge some of the simplistic premises raised in the Diplomat article linked in the post.
In that post George argues that an LHD will enable the ADF to overcome the diplomatic and political limitations that may restrict access to the host-nation facilities required to launch strikes on a third country. This is very true, but it raises the question of how often the Australian government will want to bomb countries that the neighbours of that country do not wish to be bombed? Such a situation would represent a failure in regional engagement and Australia’s soft power support to the application of its hard power capabilities. Moreover, isn’t the acquisition of the KC30 MRTT intended to address this problem? These ‘are massive and expensive resources’ as George states, but so to is an F-35B carrying LHD. Investments in the MRTT, land-strike capabilties of the P-8 and RAN units may provide a similar capability.
The argument then switches to the fleet air defence role of an F-35B. The F-35B would provide the ability to defend the fleet’s surface units. Again, this is true, but overlooks the fact that it becomes rather like a self-licking ice-cream as the main target of any strikes on the fleet that the F-35 will be tasked to defend is the LHD, which is a target because they are carrying the F-35s. The article seems to discount the utility of the Air Warfare Destroyer, which is billed to be a very effective air denial asset. The issue here is do we need control of the air around the fleet, or are we content to deny the air to an adversary. I suggest that what we require is the ability to deny the air to an adversary, investing in the capabilities of the AWD and other fleet surface units may be a wiser investment choice here.
Adding an additional concern, to operate the LHD as an aircraft carrier would mean that we would have to sail the entire RAN (or at least a large portion of it) to support and protect it, leaving little in the way of additional capacity for other important roles for the Fleet.
This is not to deny the excellent outcomes that the USMC has achieved, nor that such a capability would be a boon for the ADF. Rather, it reflects my belief that the effects can be achieved in other ways, that will not dilute the land based air combat role provided by the F-35As.
As I wrote the article quoted by Flt Lt Jenna Higgins (LHD and F-35B: The Debate Opens Up – ‘The Diplomat, 30 Nov 14), I’d like to contribute to this discussion, if I may.
Three objections have been raised here to putting F-35B on ‘Canberra’ class ships. The first is additional pilot training cost. The key point being missed here is that an additional capability would be generated. Yes, there will be a training bill, but not a big one. While a full ‘cat and trap’ or ‘STOBAR” capability takes high end pilot skill levels, and executing high tempo flying using cats and traps requires a very highly worked up ship, F-35B STOVL require a much smaller training ‘delta’ for both pilots and the ship. It’s not zero, but from my own experience it’s not much.
I do take issue with describing carrier deck training as a ‘non-combat skill’. Delivering high tempo air operations from a ship is a combat skill. Assuming that learning to operate from a ship would result in a ‘loss in combat-related training across the RAAF’s air combat capability’ or a ‘decrease in proficiency’ again ignores that we are talking about an additional capability.
The second issued raised is affordability within the defence budget. Strategy, priorities, circumstances, affordability and politics all drive the choices. The same issues very probably surrounded the RAAF’s F-35A buy. Of course, once a service has its desired equipment programme, it’s very easy for them to argue that anything else is unaffordable.
I agree that ‘resource constraints must inform strategy’ – but the resources required to execute very long-range air operations from land bases are substantial, if not particularly visible. More flying hours drive additional support costs and consume aircraft lives, as well as tremendous amounts of (not cheap) fuel. AAR tanker operations routinely involve dumping huge quantities of unused gas. Plus, at long range, more aircraft are required to deliver a given number of aircraft ‘over the target’. The USN and the French Navy are providing a large portion of the ‘air’ over the Middle East right now – there might be valid reasons for this.
That leaves what must be the key question – would F-35Bs on LHDs offer a capability that Australia needs and currently doesn’t have?
One commenter appears to dismiss potential lack of Host Nation Support (HNS) by asking ‘how often the Australian government will want to bomb countries that the neighbours of that country do not wish to be bombed’? With respect, that’s a good example of what staff course call ‘situating the appreciation’. The question could be: ‘why might countries deny us HNS?’ Look at recent history. A country might want a neighbouring country to be bombed, but they might not want to be seen to be involved. They might offer HNS, but only for AAR, not actual strike aircraft. Countries that you don’t even want HNS from might deny overflight permissions. Look back over recent years for many more examples.
Denial of HNS has, does and will happen. Denial of that fact isn’t, in my opinion, credible.
Turning to alternate means of providing the capability, it all comes down to the brutal mathematics of distance, time, speed and fuel. The RAAF can certainly deliver ordnance at long range using AAR. But given a fixed number of aircraft, the longer the range, the less they can deliver in a given time. It all depends on how much is enough.
Turning to fleet air defence, the argument appears to be that putting an air defence capability on the LHDs would invite an air attack that otherwise wouldn’t happen. So the bet is that not embarking any air defence aircraft would reduce the threat to an ADF fleet? Want to make that bet for real with China fielding more maritime combat air power every day?
Yes, the AWD is a good ship. And its missiles will be pretty effective. But total dependence on surface based missile systems to defend a fleet against a modern air threat is a hugely risky strategy. Please, trust me on this one. It’s been tried. Depending on land-based air cover is even riskier.
I’m no expert on air power terminology, but aiming for ‘air denial’ over the airspace immediately above a fleet looks like a rather long way down the NATO scale with ‘air supremacy’ at the top and ‘air incapability’ at the bottom. What if the adversary wants to shadow your fleet at outside your missile range? Or attack another fleet asset? Or attack the LHD simply because it’s your biggest ship? I think you’d probably want at least ‘air parity’ over the fleet, but I’m happy to be corrected.
I apologise for the length of the reply. I’d like to commend Flt Lt Higgins for raising the issue, and I hope this post helps take discussions forward.
“..to operate the LHD as an aircraft carrier would mean that we would have to sail the entire RAN (or at least a large portion of it) to support and protect it, leaving little in the way of additional capacity for other important roles for the Fleet.”
A typical RAN LHD task group is planned to be one destroyer, one frigate and a tanker. No admiral is likely to authorise orders without those elements in place. As per Plan Pelrous, RAN is already preparing to ditch single-ship patrols and deployments from 2018. From that date all surface ship orders will be TG-only.
When the balloon goes up fleets concentrate and do not continue with “other important roles”, such as CTF-150 piracy patrols. Not how the world works, I’m afraid.
Sorry, but claims about the whole fleet being required to support an ADF F-35B/LHD combo are wholly without foundation.
Robert and Steve: Many thanks for the continued engagement on this. You are forcing me to both re-evaluate my views and to more clearly express them.
The starting point must be that I am not opposed to the LHD/F-35B capability as a concept, my concerns are based on the opportunity costs associated with pursuing this as a capability option. Steve has highlighted, and I appreciate the authority with which he speaks, that the costs may not be as high as I thought. But there will still be costs and I do not see there is justification based on current strategic requirements.
My assumptions are as follows:
-The ADF will only have 2 x LHDs, that will be required to play a HADR role regionally, provide expeditionary support to land forces, and to provide the air capability discussed above.
– To be capable, both would have to be modified to carry F-35s.
– The ADF will only have 3 x AWDs to provide air defence to the fleet and potentially act as a BMD platform to support defence of the Australia duties.
– The ADF will have 9 x ASW Frigates.
– The LHD (based on the Juan Carlos figures) has room for 8 x F-35B.
A more important set of assumptions is to identify what this capability would be used for, the actual strategic requirements. I see essentially three roles, and these are what have been the basis of my responses:
– Contribution to a Responsibility to Protect operation such as we saw in Libya.
– Contribution to a military intervention/invasion such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
– Contribution to a state-on-state conflict such as is often discussed as being a possibility in the region.
As to the first two potential roles, I first turn to Steve’s response regarding Host Nation Support. I was unabashedly situating the appreciation, as this is important to do. Australian air power is currently deployed to support operations against Daesh with 6 x Hornets, 1 x KC30 MRTT and 1 x Wedgetail. These assets appear to be making a useful contribution to anti-Daesh operations from their current operating location. Were potential host-nations to be unsupportive of the basing Australian strike aircraft in similar situations in the future, but would be willing to accept other forms of air power, Australia could still make a valid and valuable contribution to any coalition effort through ISR, refuelling, air lift, or airborne C2 contributions. Australia would still be ‘pulling its weight’. Does the ADF need to be able to provide a strike capability to be seen to be contributing? If so, then it definitely needs to seriously consider the development of this capability. But I do not believe this is the case.
Moreover, Australia’s region does not seem to present the risk of this type of intervention being required in the foreseeable future, further raising questions about the strategic priority of such a capability. This appears to be a concern for outside the Asia-Pacific. To be sure, a Black Swan event may occur that proves me wrong, but I do not believe this would justify the opportunity cost of developing an ADF capability to deliver ship-launched air strikes.
Were the ADF to develop this capability for the first two types of situation, then my assumption would be that the Task Group mentioned by Robert would integrate with a coalition task force. This would enable the ADF to provide two additional aircraft above that which we are currently providing to Op OKRA, but at the expense of three major fleet units. Not an efficient use of resources.
In these first two roles, I acknowlege that the LHD/F-35 capability would provide additional capability to the ADF and Government, but I cannot see how this small addition in capability in a specific role can justify the additional resources.
Shifting to the third assumed role for the LHD/F-35 capability, this is the greatest problem that I have with the argument for the capability. Here I assume that in a state-on-state conflict the ADF would be operating in a contested environment. The question becomes, what are the 8 x F-35s bringing to the fight?
They would provide a limited strike OR air defence capability. Eight aircraft could not provide both.
In a conflict situation, I would be surprised if the RAN would be content to sail with 1 x AWD and 1 x frigate. When HMAS SYDNEY deployed 1RAR to Vietnam in 1965 she sailed with HMAS DUCHESS (destroyer), but as she entered the South China Sea she was met by HMAS MELBOURNE (aircraft carrier), HMAS VAMPIRE (destroyer), HMAS PARRAMATTA (Frigate) and HMAS SUPPLY (tanker). It is fair to expect that given the increased threat that a state-on-state conflict involving the ADF would entail, an Australian Carrier Task Group in a major conflict would be larger than three ships. The air and submarine threat to the LHD would be significant, and the force would have to be postured accordingly.
When I say that the required Carrier Task Group size would limit the RAN’s ability to perform other roles, I was referring to roles such as the protection of sea lines of communication for national defence, rather than anti-piracy roles further abroad. In a major conflict, we would expect that the submarine threat would be significant, and the RAN’s ASW frigates would be called upon to ensure the SLOCs remain open. There are a number of key straits that we would like to remain open and which the ADF would likely need to employ a combination of MPA and FFG. As Robert points out, these ships would not operate alone, but would themselves require protection from air threats. If the AWD’s are protecting the LHD, it leaves little to protect the other TGs.
Again, the F-35Bs launching from the Canberra Class would provide a capability, but to do so it would probably have to integrate with a USN Task Group. How much additional capability would we be adding, and would the resources not be better invested in developing other capabilities (improved ship-based air defence or ASW capabilities for example)?
I believe what has been established is that an LHD/F-35B capability would provide the ADF will strategic flexiblity. What needs to be done to progress this debate is to identify how such a capability would be operated to meet the strategic requirements that Government has identified. There also needs to be a clear identification of the full cost associated with this capability:
– The monetary and personnel costs of an additional F-35Bs
– The capability costs of changing some of the planned F-35As to Bs
– The monetary costs of modifying the LHD
– The training overheads to develop a carrier capability
– The capability losses involved in employing the LHD as a carrier vice an amphibious assault ship/helicopter support ship
– The logistics demands required to operate F-35Bs in a conflict situation from an LHD
Once these are qualified and quantified it would then be possible to fully assess the opportunity cost associated with this capability.
To close out this long reply, my argument is not against the capability as a capability, but against the opportunity cost that the investment represents. I fully agree that we CAN do this; however, my counsel is that we need to identify why we SHOULD do it. Based on my assumptions of strategic requirements, this cannot be justified. I have situated my appreciation, this may mean I lack the strategic imagination to adequately envisage the potential roles, but the replies to date have not dissuaded me from my position.
Something which has not been mentioned thus far in this debate, is that the F-35B offers a very unique and useful capability – that the F-35A does not. Apart from operating from mobile platforms such as the LHD, the F-35B can also operate from many more land based locations and short semi prepared “austere” locations.
A potential enemy can more easily formulate its plans and tactics when it knows the fixed locations from where the F-35A operates. Moreover, when the long runways that the F-35A so relies on, start being “denied” one will have a very degraded capability at best.
Gadfly postures that the LHDs will become “targets because they are carrying the F-35s”; as Steven George has rightly pointed out – they are already targets without the F-35B, being capital ships. But at least they are mobile targets, which are much harder to hit than fixed targets – the very reason USS Enterprise and USS Lexington survived the attack on Pearl Harbour. Also the very reason Welch and Taylor were able to engage the enemy that fateful day December 7th, 1941 was because their P-40’s could operate from an austere semi prepared location not known to the enemy!
In contrast airfields that any military operates fast air from are well known, certainly not mobile and most certainly are already fixed “High Value Targets” (HVT).
We recently commemorated the 75th Anniversary of the pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbour – have we learnt nothing from this event and the more recent Arab-Israeli conflicts where pre-emptive strikes were carried out on fixed HVT crippling capability in an instant.
Any runway the F-35A operates from can be targeted effectively – after which the F-35A capability at that whole airfield is neutralized. The ability of the F-35B to operate from mobile platforms such as the LHDs and many austere semi prepared locations keeps the enemy guessing making F-35B operations unpredictable and provides invaluable flexibility and capability to the war fighter. The Australian Defence Force should not forgo this capability in its global risk management as we are already heavily invested in the F-35A and the very fixed model and doctrine of its operating locations – operations from which can be very predictable to an enemy and denied at the outset of hostilities.
Why not divest some of this risk and acquire the F-35B?
Jenna Higgins is spot on!
Bar Fly: I see a couple of issues with your argument.
The requirements to support high-tempo fifth generation air combat would not be conducive to operating out of ‘austere’ and semi-prepared fields. The logistics train to ensure that the aircraft are supplied with fuel and weapons to continue to ensure that they are operationally relevant would be significant. Noting the challenges the ADF faces is supporting remote operations, doing this in a conflict situation would be exceedingly problematic. Indeed, we would be reliant on the ability to maintain air superiority to ensure we can protect the internal supply lines. Granted, it would be an excellent capability to have an aircraft that could operate from such fields, but this is all about costs. The resources could be better spent elsewhere.
In the particular case that you mention, instead of spending resources to develop a capability that can operate from semi-prepared fields in case our main operating bases are attacked, the resources would be better spent in hardening and protecting these bases: improving air and missile defence around our bases, hardening facilities, increasing redundancy.
This is the opportunity cost argument that I keep harkening back to.
Your analogy of Pearl Harbor is an interesting one. The US carriers were not struck due to an intelligence gap on the Japanese side, had the Japanese been aware of the carriers’ location, they would have been targetted. So if we believe that we can successfully hide the 2 x LHDs from a potential peer/beyond-peer adversary, then I think the analogy holds. However, we can expect that in the lead up to a conflict that an adversary would locate, track and target the LHDs for inclusion in any pre-emptive attack, the analogy breaks down. This would not, in fact, divest the risk at all.
To hypothesise further, if the LHDs are seen as floating airbases, and are therefore targetted as a priority for that reason, then we would lose the amphib capability that the LHDs provide, and which may be useful at a later stage of conflict. This must also be considered.
Sorry, but Gadfly’s post is much too long for a full reply, but I make the following points;
“The ADF will only have 2 x LHDs, that will be required to play a HADR role regionally, provide expeditionary support to land forces, and to provide the air capability discussed above.”
HADR is reactive, and does not determine where an LHD will be on the fleet ship plot at HQ or its tasking. With two LHDs the ADF will have both in service for about 40 per cent of the time, over the course of their projected lives.
“To be capable, both would have to be modified to carry F-35s.”
All current STOVL ships will require refit for F-35Bs. The ADF LHDs incorporate all the F-35B ship integration data passed along to the Spanish for JCI. Consistent claims by the Australian media and academic think tanks on this matter are wholly uninformed. Ships are refitted all the time, I might add, and the small-ish work required on the Canberras would not be a big job at all. Again, claims to the contrary are wholly uninformed.
“The LHD (based on the Juan Carlos figures) has room for 8 x F-35B.”
No. The design is optimised for 12 F-35Bs. The standard US embarked squadron will be six, and adjusted according to tasking. For the LHD air group capability as a whole, some numbers go as high as 26 aircraft, depending on the types and numbers in the mix.
“A more important set of assumptions is to identify what this capability would be used for, the actual strategic requirements. I see essentially three roles, and these are what have been the basis of my responses: Contribution to a Responsibility to Protect operation such as we saw in Libya …”
Sorry, but that’s not at all relevant. Let me put it this way – in 1999 the entirety of the ADF was yanked away from whatever else it was doing for Interfet. Commanders prioritise tasking and deployment. Some jobs are disposable. In 1982 the British detached a much-needed DDG from the Gulf for the Falklands, despite the patrol having a high tasking priority.
“Australia’s region does not seem to present the risk of this type of intervention being required in the foreseeable future, further raising questions about the strategic priority of such a capability.”
The authors of plans Jericho and Pelorus might not agree with that.
“What are the 8 x F-35s bringing to the fight?”
A distinct ability to ruin the bad guy’s day. That’s what they’re for and why they cost so much.
“They would provide a limited strike OR air defence capability. Eight aircraft could not provide both.”
Wrong. If you doubt that, then please advise the USMC, RN, RAF and Italian navy to that effect.
In the interests of brevity I’ll leave it there.
Just one thing, though, pointed out to me by someone elsewhere on the net: an Australian academic has just said, in reply to Flt Higgins’s post, that the F-35B would degrade ADF amphibiosity. No, what would degrade a deployed ADF amphib group is being without persistent air defence when the bad guys make an unexpected – ie unknown unknown – marstrike, and the ADF suddenly has sunk or badly damaged ships and a great many dead personnel. Real deployments are bit different to academic theories thereof.
Robert:
I shall keep this response as short as possible.
– We seem to agree: With only 2 ships available 40% of the time. Where we differ is what that means. There will be a demand on them. This will be for training, and for actual operations. My point is that as you become a jack of all trades and the demand rises, the capability becomes maxed out. My argument is not that this is an insurmountable problem, but it is not something that can be waved away. Is the RAN currently experiencing a manageable task load based? I cannot answer that question, but it needs to be answered as part of this discussion.
– We need to quantify the ‘not a big job’. Ship modifications can experience significant issues. Defence projects (acquisitions and upgrades) do have a habit of not being as easy as the organisation likes to present. Again, not an insurmountable issue, but this needs to be qualified and quantified. My argument is about opportunity cost, not against the capability itself.
– The amount of aircraft matter. For the capability argument to be made, there needs to be a clear identification of what the ship will sail with in its various roles. That would then enable an cost-benefit analysis.
– I’m not sure how the intended or considered roles are not relevant. This should be the basis for the development of any capability.
– I don’t believe that JERICHO is about developing an appreciation of the changes in the geostrategic situation. It is about developing ‘a future force that is agile and adaptive, fully immersed in the information age, and truly joint.’ I have not heard from any source that there is an expectation that the ADF will be engaged in a RTP or military intervention in the Asia-Pacific. I did not discount the possibility of a state-on-state conflict though.
– I’m not sure how to respond to your response to my statement about the limitations of only 8 aircraft. In the Lightning Carrier Concept Demonstrator that was the source of Higgins’s post, the USMC used 10 x JSF to conduct the mission (4 x conducting SEAD, 2 x escort of the MV-22s). That leaves 2 for air defence of the fleet. Assuming 100% serviceability, this still means balancing the rate of effort to ensure a persistent fleet air defence capability in a contested environment while supporting strike operations would be exceedingly difficult. I accept that the RN did a great job in the Falklands, but I counter that this was a unique situation. It should not be discounted, but it should not be used as the justification without an exploration of the contextual differences between that situation and the ones the ADF should anticipate.
Regarding your final point. I have not made that point, nor have I seen it. However, the reduction in the amphib capability resulting from the use of the LHD as an aircraft carrier is something that must be considered. If you are carrying a maximum load of F-35s with all the logistics support that is required to conduct air operations, your ability to carry 2RAR is severely degraded. The choice must be one or the other, unless the ADF will sail both LHDs, which is always an option.
In closing, it would appear that the main thrust of my argument appears to be lost from the focus of the specifics. To reiterate, my question is: What is strategic requirement for an LHD/F-35B capability that would justify the opportunity cost associated with its development? I firmly believe that the the resources would perhaps be better spent on developing and improving fleet ASW capabilities and ship-based air defence, developing land-strike capabilities.
Gadfly, I think you are missing my point – it is all about mobility and being unpredictable to the enemy, Hitler thought he could harden his defences, so did Saddam Hussein, history is littered with static defence disasters. You cannot harden a 2.5 km long runway no matter how much money you throw at it.
You seem to dwell on the LHDs becoming targets because they are carrying F-35Bs, do you think an enemy will spare them simply because they are not carrying the F-35B?
I would expect satellites and GPS to go down in a high intensity conflict – you would be surprised how the LHDs can disappear in that space because of mobility (while the airfields will still be where they were the day before!) In a low intensity conflict the enemy may not have the resources to track where individual boats are – remember the Falklands War, the Argentine forces were not able to find the British carriers, but the runways and airfields on the islands were easy targets for the British.
You talk of opportunity cost, and logistics trains; well, there is an opportunity cost to everything, even the F-35A. The US Navy and Marine Corps have taken all the risk in the development of the F-35B, so what is there to lose by capitalising on the unique capability of this jet? We have the LHDs already, and there is plenty of space in the outback for austere training operations. Look at the latest news: the Marines will deploy the F-35B from the British QE class carriers, and the last time I looked the Pacific was expecting the first squadron deployment and operational cruise with F-35B aboard. We could also benefit from joint operations with the Americans in any future conflict if required in having the same type of aircraft and spares etc…and cross deck/austere operations. It is not as if we would be the only operator of the F-35B in the Pacific.
The Israelis have considerable experience in warfighting and they are seriously looking at acquiring the F-35B for just the reasons I have mentioned – austere operations. And we have the added benefit of having 2 LHDs, which they do not, and which will make us even more unpredictable.
What is there to lose?
First, a great many thanks to Central Blue for correcting my last post for formatting issues. Again, thank you.
Second, there is no opportunity cost in any of this. The ADF has long been slated to put 100 F-35s into service. The 72 F-35As on order will proffer lethal capability defined herewith as ABC. Another 28 F-35As is just more ABC.
Should 28 F-35Bs come along, then ADF F-35 capability will expand from ABC to ABC+DEF, with the same number of assets.
And with that, I’m invoking my right to secular Trappist monkery and departing this chat.
[…] But the debate continues, and as Australia’s strategic situation seems to be in flux (not least because of the election of U.S. President Donald Trump), longstanding procurement plans may merit reconsideration. […]